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FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN SYSTEMS BIOLOGY  
 
Summary 
In the context of scientists’ reflections on genomics, we examine some 
fundamental issues in the emerging postgenomic discipline of systems biology. 
Systems biology is best understood as consisting of two streams. One, which we 
shall call ‘pragmatic systems biology’, emphasizes large-scale molecular 
interactions; the other, which we shall refer to as ‘systems-theoretic biology’, 
emphasizes system principles. Both are committed to mathematical modelling, 
and both lack a clear account of what biological systems are. We discuss the 
underlying issues in identifying systems and how causality operates at different 
levels of organization. We suggest that resolving such basic problems is a key 
task for successful systems biology, and that philosophers could contribute to its 
realization. We conclude with an argument for more sociologically informed 
collaboration between scientists and philosophers. 
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FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN SYSTEMS BIOLOGY  
 
 
As genomics matures from a data-collecting enterprise to an explanatory 
science, and as those scientific endeavours take on disciplinary contours, a 
range of underlying issues are being explicitly and implicitly addressed by the 
scientists involved. These reflections are an important part of the way a discipline 
constitutes itself as a field by setting out central problems and achievements 
alongside a history of conceptual and empirical precursors. One of the most 
widely discussed fields in emergent genomics is systems biology, and it raises 
several important questions that need to be resolved if the science is to advance. 
The issues that are most fundamental are how the systems that are the focus of 
systems biology are defined, and how those definitions affect the research 
agendas that arise from earlier scientific legacies.  
 
Preceding interpretations of genomics 
The early days of genomics began with fairly simple conceptualizations that 
emphasized the shift from identifying genes to sequencing and mapping entire 
genomes. (1) As the data poured in and the field achieved wide recognition, these 
definitions were expanded to give greater emphasis to functional analyses. (2, 3) 
Although much of the discussion of the status of genomes has been conducted 
via evaluations of the evolving metaphors in genomic discourse – from the 
ineptness of the blueprint metaphor to analogies with jazz scores and Theseus’s 
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ship –  (4, 5, 6) there are also some excellent systematic discussions of genome 
conceptualizations. (7) 
 
Two issues concerning the status of knowledge in genomics are frequently 
discussed. The first is that early genomics shared the reductionist aspirations of 
genetics, which led to a preoccupation with sequence structure and deterministic 
accounts of function. (3,  8) Persistent (and prescient) demands for a more 
hierarchical and less simplistically deterministic understanding of molecular 
processes were voiced even in the early years of genomics. (9, 10) These calls 
increased with the proliferation of sequence information and eventually combined 
with a second concern that genomic processes could usually be described only 
by qualitative statements such as ‘Gene A inhibits Gene B’. (11, 12, 13) For many 
biologists, the real future of genomics lies in its dual potential for going beyond 
reductionism and for becoming a quantitative science. The developing anti-
reductionist consensus – a distinct but by no means universal trend – requires a 
move from the dissection of things to the dynamics of processes, thus 
necessitating a trade-off between mechanistic detail and quantitative tractability.  
 
Another central epistemological issue was explored by Roger Brent in his 2000 
paper, ‘Genomic biology’. (14) The article attributes the decline of hypothesis-
driven research in biology to the growing influence of the data-driven or discovery 
approach of genomics (for objections to these categories, see (15, 16, 17)). Although 
Brent believes many claims made on the basis of genomic observations may 
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never be tested because of changed scientific standards, most commentators 
see the data-driven approach as a preliminary phase in the development of a 
true science in which experimentation and hypothesis testing eventually play 
pivotal roles. (18, 12)  
 
Many scientists talk about a genomics ‘revolution’ because of the dramatic 
changes the field exhibits in technology, scientific practice, social organization 
and biological understanding. (13, 14, 19, 20) Although such changes have major 
implications for more general or philosophical understandings of science, 
professional philosophers have made only minor contributions to the issues that 
are peculiar to genomics. Most philosophical discussions of genomics conducted 
within the discipline of philosophy are, in fact, bioethical and concerned 
exclusively with human genomics, human nature and personal identity. (21)  
Scientists often perceive philosophers as distant observers who interpret 
episodes in science when they are already over. Regardless of whether this is a 
fair description or not, there is certainly a movement now for philosophers to 
engage with biological science at its cutting edge (for example (22, 23)). 
 
Our argument in this paper is twofold. The first point is that the philosophical 
issues under discussion in the emerging genomics research programme of 
systems biology must be addressed in order for the science to achieve its stated 
goals. The second is that the resolution of such problems could be most 
effectively achieved by closer collaboration between scientists and philosophers. 
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SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 
 
As the Human Genome Project gathered momentum and its initial goal of a draft 
sequence drew closer, scientists and policy makers began increasingly to 
articulate visions of how technology-driven acquisitions of genomic knowledge 
could be transformed into explanatory accounts and strategies of intervention. (24) 
These ideas drew sustenance from earlier aspirations to understand complex 
biological organization and its properties in ways that went beyond simple 
genetic determinism. The general area on which many of these ambitions and 
hopes converged is now what is called ‘systems biology’. The overarching aim of 
systems biology is ‘the ultimate goal of modern biology: to obtain a fundamental, 
comprehensive and systematic understanding of life’. (25) This understanding is 
sought not just in relation to humans (though human health is a focus of much 
systems biology), but for a wide range of organisms including microbes and 
plants. To achieve this goal, systems biologists intend to integrate and explain 
global DNA, RNA, protein and metabolite data by combining mathematical 
modelling and extensive computational analysis with large-scale experimental 
techniques. (26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31) 
 
Not only is systems biology predicted generally to transform biological 
understanding and practice, (29, 32) but its methods and concepts are anticipated 
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to have important effects on other sciences such as physics, engineering, 
mathematics, and social science. (33) Strong arguments are made that systems 
biology is more than just an extension of genomics and bioinformatics – it is 
indeed their necessary and ‘natural’ conclusion, but it is also something 
qualitatively different from what has already been achieved by the various ‘omic’ 
tools and findings. (34, 35, 36) A good question to ask, therefore, is whether systems 
biology sets itself apart from earlier genomics because of its object (‘systems’) or 
because of the way it does things (‘systematically’). 
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TABLE ONE:  CATEGORIZATIONS OF SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 
 Type One Type Two 
Haubelt et al., 
2000 37  
 
Label 
 
Precursors 
 
 
 
Focus 
 
 
 
Biological systems biology 
 
Reductionist molecular 
biology 
 
 
Integration of data from 
different levels & sources 
 
 
Systems-oriented biology 
 
Cybernetics; network theory in 
electronics; biochemical systems 
theory (BST) and metabolic control 
analysis (MCA); cell biology 
System functions and properties 
Huang, 2003 
11 
 
Label 
 
Precursors 
 
Focus 
 
 
 
Localists 
 
Classical molecular biology 
 
Large datasets of constituent 
parts; ‘pathway-centric’ 
 
 
Globalists 
 
General networks (physics 
perspective); Kauffman 38 
Deeper principles of complex 
systems; wholes 
Levesque & 
Benfey, 2004 
39 
Label 
 
Precursors 
 
Focus 
 
 
 
Panomicists 
 
Reductionist molecular 
biology; genomics 
Components; reconstruction 
of networks from high-
throughput data 
 
 
Dynamicists 
 
Systems theory 
 
Modelling networks as complex 
systems; applying principles of 
systems theory 
Westerhoff & 
Palsson, 2004 
36 
Label 
 
 
Precursors 
 
Focus 
 
 
 
Biology-rooted systems 
biology 
 
Mainstream molecular 
biology; genomics 
Pattern recognition and 
phenomenological modelling 
of macromolecular 
interactions 
 
 
Systems-rooted biology 
 
 
Non-equilibrium thermodynamics; 
self-organization; BST & MCA 
New functional states arising from 
simultaneous interactions of 
multiple molecules; fundamental 
principles and laws 
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The objects of systems biology 
 
Under the systems biology rubric are two different (but not mutually exclusive) 
understandings of ‘system’. The first account is given by scientists who find it 
useful for various reasons (including access to funding) to refer to the 
interconnected phenomena they study as ‘systems’. The second definition comes 
from scientists who insist that systems principles are imperative to the successful 
development of systems biology. We could call the first group ‘pragmatic systems 
biologists’ and the second ‘systems-theoretic biologists’ (for a variety of similar 
divisions and somewhat different interpretations, see Table 1). The majority of 
today’s systems biologists fall into the former category, united simply by an 
agreement that systems biology involves the study of interacting molecular 
phenomena through the integration of multilevel data and models. (40) For them, 
‘system’ is a convenient but vague term that covers a range of detailed 
interactions with specifiable functions. (41, 11) The main force behind the 
development of this science is the technology that enables increasingly 
comprehensive data to be collected and then collectively analysed. (42) 
 
For hard-line systems-theoretic biologists, however, an ad hoc approach to 
systems is inadequate. It is crucial, they argue, ‘to analyse systems as systems, 
and not as mere collections of parts’ in order to understand the emergent 
properties of component interactions. (43, 27, 34) Systems are taken to constitute a 
fundamental ontological category, and differences between biological and 
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human-made (engineered) systems are considered less important than their 
similarities. (44, 34) Although this form of systems biology developed in response to 
the genomics ‘revolution’, it draws on much earlier systems theorists such as 
cyberneticists Norbert Wiener (45) and W. Ross Ashby (46), general and 
organismal system theorist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, (47, 48) mathematical 
biophysicists Nicolas Rashevsky (49) and Robert Rosen, (50) systems engineer 
Mihajlo Mesarović, (51) and (very occasionally) living systems theorist James 
Miller. (52) System definitions derived from these sources are very abstract and 
generalizable, usually no more specific than ‘complex structures of 
interdependent and subordinate components whose relationships and properties 
are largely determined by their function in the whole’. (35) The use of universal 
systems definitions is more than a pledge of allegiance to general systems 
theory; they are proposed as the theoretical orientations through which biological 
data should be approached. However, it is widely recognized that theories such 
as Bertalanffy’s are too abstract for today’s systems biology. (53) 
 
Genomes-in-systems 
Although systems are not closely defined by either stream of systems biology, it 
is helpful to see how these general notions of system are related to the way 
genomes are conceptualized. Although all systems biologists agree that 
genomes are not deterministic programmes, there does appear to be a difference 
of conceptual emphasis between pragmatic-systems and systems-theoretic 
accounts of genomes. For the former, genes and genomes still have a degree of 
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causal and informational priority over other levels of molecules. They are given 
the status of precisely definable ‘digital cores of information’ that drive the 
interactions constituting systems. (54, 26, 33)  
 
From the systems-theoretic perspective, the demotion of the genome goes 
further. Genomes in this framework do not explain anything: they ‘merely’ 
comprise some of the components on which higher-level system properties 
depend. (55, 36) The study of genomes becomes simply an exploratory or first-level 
tool for the analysis of cells and tissues. This conception of genomes and 
genomics makes it clear that the primary objects of system-theoretical inquiry are 
higher-level processes and properties rather than the more concrete molecular 
bases of these phenomena.   
 
 
Issues in the investigation of biological systems  
 
For both sorts of systems biologists, what really matters is the modelling process 
and how it navigates between the demand for abstraction and the need for detail. 
Models or simplifying abstractions are designed to synthesize information and 
transform datasets into biological insight. (56, 57) Biology has traditionally used 
‘mental models’ in diagrammatic form or as natural language narratives, but their 
imprecision and limited scope makes them inadequate for charting and 
explaining complex molecular interactions and their emergent properties. (58, 59, 60) 
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Mathematical modelling is not new to molecular biology, but systems biology is 
the first genomic discipline to rely so unreservedly on it.  
 
Model tools and concepts are seldom drawn in any detail from systems 
predecessors – not even from highly favoured ones such as Rosen (61) – but from 
biochemical, electrical and systems engineering. (41, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65) Once a model 
has been developed to an appropriate level of complexity, it can be run 
repeatedly by a computer and function as a high-throughput hypothesis tester. 
(58, 60) Ultimately, the results of simulations must confront more traditional real 
world experimentation, although the proportion of such tests reduces bench 
experimentation to a supplement or safeguard. 
 
Rather than discussing in detail the sorts of modelling tools systems biologists 
use (a topic that will soon repay close philosophical scrutiny), we will look at 
some of the most general epistemological claims about the modelling process. 
Systems biologists classify modelling approaches into three categories: bottom-
up, top-down, middle-out. (66, 67, 68) Bottom-up modelling starts with DNA and 
proteins, then works upwards to try and characterize higher-level processes; top-
down approaches begin with high-level functions and then incorporate the 
details. Some modellers believe both have such serious practical and in-principle 
problems (67) that a ‘middle-out’ approach must be developed. Their proposal is to 
start somewhere in-between the top and bottom levels, then work out towards a 
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hierarchy of models. Naturally enough, there is disagreement about where these 
levels begin. What some call the middle, others see as the bottom. (66)  
 
The division of systems approaches into two streams is mirrored by modelling 
strategy. Pragmatic systems biology is most commonly characterized by a 
bottom-up (sometimes middle-out) approach, whereas systems-theoretic biology 
takes a top-down perspective and aims for ‘fundamental principles and laws’. (36, 
44) Pragmatic bottom-up modelling is concerned with connecting molecular 
interactions and thus extends the approaches of early genomics. It might be 
considered a continuation of reductionist strategies, although any such admission 
is usually accompanied by plans to scale up to higher levels of process and 
modelling. (69) The general assumption is that systems, whatever they are, will 
appear ‘naturally’ from biological reality rather than be imposed by (artificial) 
theory. Systems-theoretic approaches, on the other hand, are launched from 
system principles and seek to establish a new tradition of non-reductionist but 
still molecular inquiry. Crucially, no systems biologist finds it satisfactory to 
restrict inquiry to one level, wherever it is begun. It is the aim of integrating 
different levels that presents the fundamental objection to a traditional reductive 
molecular approach. 
 
Integration of approaches 
The perceived need for systems biology to integrate levels of biological data is 
mirrored by an insistence on the integration of its constituent disciplines, methods 
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and modes of inquiry – especially discovery and hypothesis-driven approaches, 
and more narrowly, wet and dry experimentation. (12,  26, 29, 40, 54, 62, 58) The 
common theme of all outlines of systems biology is integration, hence systems 
biology’s other moniker of ‘integrative biology’. (70, 71) None of this discussion, 
however, goes much beyond endorsing such fusions.  
 
One aspect of integration that is less touched on and potentially more 
contentious is the integration of pragmatic systems biology with systems-
theoretic biology. How important is it for the success of systems biology that the 
two streams become one? This is not an issue for practical systems biologists, 
who mostly think ‘the more the better’ in regard to data and analysis of all kinds. 
They diagnose the non-fulfilment of earlier systems biology promises as a 
straightforward fault of inadequate molecular understandings and insufficient 
data. (37) Predictably, systems-theoretic biologists believe that primary research 
questions must be framed by systems concepts in order for a genuine and 
successful systems biology to develop. ( 35, 36, 11)  
 
Crucial issues for systems biology 
 
A major reason these differences exist (and are unlikely to be remedied by 
different levels of models coming together) is because of the lack of a clear 
ontology of systems in either perspective. Both systems biologies are currently 
less about systems (in a theoretical sense) than about aspirations towards 
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systematic and thoroughgoing approaches to the phenomena of interest. The 
field could, therefore, be described as an epistemological commitment to a 
general approach that foregrounds mathematical modelling in order to capture 
system dynamics and transcend piecemeal analyses of interconnected 
biochemical processes.  
 
The key question for both systems biologies is not only ‘what is a system?’ but 
‘what biological units map onto those systems?’ The former question is a central 
concern of the systems-theoretic approach, but the answers it offers are of 
limited use without a demonstrably productive answer to the latter question.  
Cells are obvious candidates but the crucial properties that constitute them as 
such, and that might also constitute other objects as biological systems, remain 
to be determined. Although pragmatic systems biology has already met with 
considerable success, it does not want to be terminally pragmatic and must 
eventually generate enough theory to inform the integration of genomic and non-
genomic levels of localized interactions. Theory need not mean universalizations 
extracted from the specific abstractions of systems luminaries such as 
Bertalanffy, however. The project of localizing and defining biological systems 
can instead be developed within existing practice. This project could accomplish 
two things: it could make the new systems biology theoretically self-sustaining, 
and it might integrate the two streams of system approaches as they map system 
concepts onto biological hierarchies. In relation to concepts of genomes, for 
example, it is certainly conceivable that a pragmatic systems biology could be 
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developed which accepts the full decentring of the genome envisaged by 
systems-theoretic approaches. A unified pragmatic and theoretic systems biology 
would take a step forward that is more than either a continuation of traditional 
genomic approaches or a revival of older systems terminology. 
 
The primary task for such a science would be what could be identified as the 
third crucial question for systems biology: ‘how are individual biological units and 
their behaviours altered, controlled or constrained by becoming components of 
the system?’ (22) Systems biology of any persuasion has to demonstrate that 
when single components come together and form a system, they engage in novel 
behaviour and produce novel phenomena by the system itself constraining the 
components. Understanding this downward causation (or how causality operates 
at different levels of organization) and the differences between units acting in 
aggregation and systematic organization is the true and distinctive purpose of 
systems biology. A substantive answer to this question should cash out the 
definite but sometimes inchoate anti-reductionist intuitions prevalent in 
contemporary molecular biology. This last question, therefore, builds on the 
ontological issues to become an epistemological one that lies at the very heart of 
systems science. 
 
Applications to a proposed system 
One way to think about how these philosophical issues are connected and 
intimately tied to the science is by taking a quick look at another of the new 
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genomics disciplines, metagenomics. Analyses of metagenomes, or composite 
genomes of microbial assemblages in particular habitats, (72, 73) provide a new 
way at looking at in situ microbial communities and the relationships between 
genomes, organisms, populations and environments. (74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80) Although 
metagenomics is still at an early stage of constructing massive sequence 
inventories or gathering functional information, (81, 82, 83, 84) the field could 
potentially lead to radical reappraisals of the nature of boundaries between 
biological entities and the organization of life itself. At the very least, it challenges 
highly individualistic assumptions of biological and molecular interaction. (85, 86) 
 
The realization of metagenomics as a true ‘microbial systems science’ in which 
ecosystems are systematically analysed as ‘metaorganisms’ or ‘complex 
biological networks across multiple hierarchical levels’ (74, 87, 88, 31) will depend on 
finding the right levels of organization to analyse. Even if some of the most 
provocative ontological problems raised by contested claims about horizontal 
gene transfer (89, 90, 91) are left aside, the study of metagenomes (and 
metaproteomes and metametabolomes) indicates that taking a system 
perspective requires ontological flexibility and epistemological openmindedness 
about where to focus the science. Non-system ways of thinking may limit the 
novelty of such science (it will default to the traditional study of lots of interacting 
molecules and organisms) while, on the other hand, allowing serious questions 
about the viability of system concepts for understanding such extended entities 
as ecosystems to be avoided. For the microbiologists who are thinking about 
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microbial systems science, the test will be the identification of emergent causal 
properties of systems. This will require demonstrations that the behaviour of 
single components cannot be understood simply in terms of their intrinsic 
properties, but must be seen as simultaneously determined by features of the 
systems of which they are part. (92, 93) 
 
Other issues 
As well as developing productive accounts of systems ontology and causality, 
there are a number of other philosophical questions to be asked and answered 
by systems biologists and observers of the field. One would be an analysis of the 
implications of the in silico emphasis of systems biology for traditional 
philosophies of experimentation. Although the logic of experimentation is closely 
related to the logic of modelling, the traditional boundaries between experiment 
and model are being challenged by systems biology. A closely connected 
concern is whether the validity of in silico testing can ever be comparable with 
that of in vivo tests, or whether in silico results have ultimately to be supported by 
‘real’ experimental results. Although standards for testing might be shaped by the 
convenience, cheapness, and political advantages of side-stepping animal 
testing (an important systems biology aim), scientific as well as consumer 
scepticism about the transfer of in silico results to in vivo treatment will have to 
be anticipated, most obviously in applications to drug discovery.  
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A final issue is how the transfer to biology of systems engineering concepts and 
tools (such as robustness and circuit design) will affect biological concepts such 
as evolution and selection. While systems-theoretic proponents might perceive 
as straightforward and sensible the relegation of selection to the ‘fine tuning’ of 
structures based on design principles, (11, 63) pragmatic systems biologists – who 
are more inclined to prioritize notions of contingency, tinkering and adaptation – 
will be more sceptical about allowing the conceptual framework of design to 
predominate. (69) If general design principles were to trump contingent selection, 
the science of biology could once again be conceived of as a search for laws 
rather than the investigation of historical outcomes of unknown generality. 
Systems biology thus encapsulates some of the oldest philosophical tensions in 
biology and perhaps can be interpreted as just their latest manifestation – an 
interpretation that must inevitably engender a degree of scepticism about the 
likelihood that systems biology will lead to their solution. All these questions 
barely touch upon the fact that the future of systems biology will be shaped as 
much by social factors as by scientific and philosophical ones, with different ways 
of thinking about systems evolving within a context of ‘big biology’ funding, 
industry expectations, and conflicts between diverse disciplinary cultures 
provoked by the interdisciplinary mandates inherent in systems biology. (26, 94, 95) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although it is early days yet for understanding the philosophical issues in 
systems biology, identifying and conceptualizing the systems central to each 
inquiry is clearly a basic philosophical issue integral to the success of the 
science. Understanding how cells, organisms and communities are to be 
understood in a hierarchy of dynamic processes is, of course, exactly the task 
systems biology has set itself and there are grounds for optimism that either 
stream of systems biology may provide important insights into this problem. 
However, since the history of systems biology has generally been one of failure, 
and because there are some key philosophical tensions that could seriously 
hamper the development of systems biology, it seems that making some special 
philosophical efforts in these crucial early days of systems biology would be 
worthwhile.  
 
Programmatic outlines of systems biology are constantly rehearsing arguments 
for interdisciplinarity, and we think our analysis has shown that there are good 
reasons for those interdisciplinary efforts to include philosophers. Even though 
we have pointed out that philosophers haven’t as yet been that interested in 
genomics for its own sake, the issues raised by systems biology are likely to 
make the idea of closer involvement with the science a very attractive 
proposition. Philosophical approaches such as developmental systems theory 
(DST), 96 which locates a deprioritized genome within a hierarchy of biological 
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levels that include environments, would seem to have natural affinities with 
systems biology. 97 Systems biology in turn offers DST’s currently critical 
abstractions a constructive grounding for future research orientations. The form 
and scope of any such philosophical-scientific collaboration would, of course, be 
dictated by particular research programmes and their needs, but we presume 
there would always be room for innovative thinking about how to proceed. 
 
We would also emphasize that more questions need to be addressed than the 
key three issues of ‘What is a system? What biological units map on to systems? 
How do systems constrain individual components?’ As we already mentioned, a 
whole gamut of social and economic forces, including the restructuring of 
scientific roles in novel interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary contexts, are 
shaping the direction and content of systems biology. Although philosophers of 
science and scientists have often discounted or ignored such social factors, their 
evident impact on genomics has made such bracketing impossible. Scientists 
and philosophers will need to develop sociologically informed philosophies of 
systems biology in order to offer the most valuable guidance to scientific practice 
in a time of rapid change. 
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